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INCREASING PRESIDENTIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN
BIG-TIME INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS
RODNEY K. SMITH*
I. INTRODUCTION
The 1980s and 1990s evidenced an increased acceptance of re-
sponsibility for the oversight of intercollegiate athletics on the part
of chief executive officers ("presidents") at major universities. This
Article examines the historical development and implications of in-
creased presidential accountability. Section II summarizes the de-
velopment of presidential involvement in the National Collegiate
Athletic Association (NCAA). Section III outlines developments in
the NCAA's rules and infractions process, intimating that presi-
dents may be held personally accountable for oversight of big-time
intercollegiate athletics at their home institutions. Section III fur-
ther argues that increasing presidential accountability is a positive
trend that will complement constructive developments in terms of
presidential involvement in the NCAA and at the institutional level.
Finally, Section IV offers concluding observations and a call for
increased presidential accountability in major intercollegiate ath-
letics.
II. PRESIDENTIAL INVOLVEMENT IN GOVERNANCE OF BIG-TIME
INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS
University presidents have become increasingly involved in the
governance and oversight of intercollegiate athletics, especially at
the NCAA Division I level.' Such contributions have been en-
hanced for several reasons. First, presidents are striving to maintain
* Herff Chair of Excellence in Law, Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law, The
University of Memphis. I gratefilly acknowledge the excellent research assistance
provided by Leanne Austin and the ever-capable technical support of Karol Us-
mani. I also express my appreciation for the work of my former student, Matthew
Melmon, regarding the issue of institutional control.
1. This Article focuses on presidential involvement and accountability at ma-
jor universities at the Division I-A level (major intercollegiate athletics) - universi-
ties with significant revenue-producing intercollegiate athletic programs. These
revenue-producing programs primarily include football and men's basketball at
the Division I-A level, although other sports, such as men's hockey and some wo-
men's basketball programs at the Division I level, also can generate significant
revenue.
(297)
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the academic quality of all their programs, including athletics. 2 In
particular, presidents believe there are serious academic issues that
must be addressed in the governance of major intercollegiate ath-
letics, and that athletic directors, who historically have exercised
primary oversight of intercollegiate athletics, have not been effec-
tive in addressing these issues.3 Moreover, presidents have in-
creased their involvement for financial reasons. Specifically,
increased expenses associated with intercollegiate athletics necessi-
tate presidential involvement in order to contain costs, increase rev-
enue generation, and balance budgets in the highly
commercialized world of intercollegiate athletics. 4 Today, revenues
2. See Myles Brand, Editorial, Presidents Have Cause, Means to Reduce Arms,
NCAA NEWS, Feb. 12, 2001 (discussing role of university presidents in academic
reform movement), available at http://www.ncaa.org/news/2001/20010212/com-
ment.html. Myles Brand, former President of Indiana University-Bloomington
and current Chief Executive Officer of the NCAA, explained that "[u]niversity
presidents believe their primary job is to preserve and create environments where
new knowledge can be discovered, transmitted, and preserved. But often, the pub-
lic sees the university differently. For them, the most visible and vital role played
by these institutions is as a sponsor of athletics teams." Id.
3. See id. (suggesting coaches and athletic directors are part of recent negative
trends in college sports). Myles Brand noted:
Despite increased revenue, athletics departments tend to overreach. In
pursuit of more entertainment dollars, many universities have launched
an "arms race" in the building of new facilities.... But athletics success
cannot substitute for academic success. Universities must be judged by
their achievements as academic institutions, not as sports franchises. I
believe now is the right time to renew the athletics reform movement.
Call it "Academics First." Presidential control of athletics must be a cor-
nerstone of this effort. Presidents must work to eliminate the excesses of
commercialism, to ensure the academic success of student-athletes, and
to make certain that athletics programs enhance and support the larger
academic mission of the university.
Id.
4. See generally Rodney K. Smith, Reforming Intercollegiate Athletics: A Critique of
the Presidents Commission s Role in the NCAA 's Sixth Special Convention, 64 N.D. L. REX.
423, 423 (1988) [hereinafter Presidents Commission] (discussing series of cost-con-
tainment measures offered by presidents to keep spiraling costs of intercollegiate
athletics programs at major universities). Since 1988, the need for cost contain-
ment has intensified, with increased pressure in tight budgetary times to provide
sufficient revenue to cover the costs of major intercollegiate athletics programs.
See JAMES L. SHULMAN & WILLIAM G. BOWEN, THE GAME OF LIFE: COLLEGE SPORTS
AND EDUCATIONAL VALUES 267 (Princeton Univ. Press 2001) ("Athletic budgets,
seen on a 'net' basis, should be regarded as expenditures by the institution that
must be justified in terms of the contribution they do or do not make."). As one
commentator recently noted:
A tiny number - most observers think fewer than 20 - make enough
money from athletics to provide all their teams with the best coaches,
facilities, uniforms, and travel opportunities money can buy. The other
300 or so teams in Division I try their best to keep up, but often must dip
into institutional coffers to try to keep LP with the top teams.
Welch Suggs, Minnesota's Golden Gophers Face a Financial Hole., CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC., Feb. 8, 2002, at A39. Financial challenges require the attention of the presi-
[Vol. 10: p. 297
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generated by intercollegiate athletic programs are substantial.5 In
reality, however, such revenues are usually offset and often over-
come by the net costs of maintaining such programs, unless a
school consistently has fielded successful teams.6
Overall, the two preceding reasons for increased presidential
involvement in college athletics typically coincide. Nonetheless, sit-
uations arise where such concerns conflict and place enormous
pressure on presidents, athletics departments, coaches, and stu-
dent-athletes.7 Therefore, as demands upon financial resources
and academic integrity have increased, it is not surprising that pres-
idents have become increasingly involved in controlling intercolle-
giate athletics at the Division I level during the past two decades.
dents and chancellors at major universities. See Kay Hawes, A Presidential Era: Insti-
tutional CEOs Launch Reforms in College Athletics, NCAA NEWS, Dec. 20, 1999
[hereinafter Presidential Era] ("[P]residents [are] those ultimately responsible for
the bottom line at universities."), available at http://www.ncaa.org/news/1999/
19991220/active/3626n25.html. Indeed, a vicious cycle develops: in order to pro-
vide sufficient funds from the few revenue-producing sports to cover the costs of
those that produce little or no revenue and to remain competitive in the revenue-
producing sports, it is necessary to emphasize winning because revenue-producing
programs generally must win in order to remain commercially viable. See SHULMAN
& BOWEN, supra note 4, at 267 (noting correlation between continued sports suc-
cess and revenue generated).
5. See NewsHour with Jim Lehrer: Dollars, Dunks and Diplomas, (PBS television
broadcast, July 9, 2001) (discussing prospect of reformation of college athletics,
noting that it has become $60 billion per year industry), available at http://
Aw.pbs.org/newshour/bb/education/july-decOl /ncaa07-09.html; see also OHIo
STATE UNIvERSIIY, DEPARTMENT OF ATHLETICS, 2001-2002 APPROVED BUDGET (June
13, 2001) (showing approved budget of $54,988,000 for 2001 to 2002), available at
http://senate.ohio-state.edu/AthleticBudget.pdf; UF Facts & Rankings, at http://
www.ufl.edu/facts.html#html (last modified Mar. 6, 2003) (showing 2001 to 2002
University of Florida Athletic Association operating budget of $44,234,795).
6. See SHULMAN & BOWEN, supra note 4, at 267. Even when big-time athletic
programs are consistently successful, "most schools lose money, and it is unlikely
that any school comes close to covering its full costs if proper allowances are made
for the capital intensive nature of athletics." Id.
7. See id. at 295 (exemplifying such conflict in setting of men's college basket-
ball and football). In fact:
Given the great pressures to win, it is hardly surprising that it is in football
and men's basketball that we find the most widely publicized scandals
and other forms of bad behavior: cheating, falsification of academic
records, point shaving, gambling, violence, and other blatant abuses that
attract the attention of the media. Such incidents, even if infrequent and
sometimes presented out of context, call into question the core values of
the institutions where they occur and, most important of all, send wrong
messages to aspiring athletes, high schools, coaches, members of campus
communities, and society at large. The attendant bad publicity for higher
education is a genuine concern, but the underlying challenges to educa-
tional values are of still greater importance.
20031 299
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A. The Rise of Presidential Involvement in the Governance
of Intercollegiate Athletics Within the NCAA: 1980-2000
Prior to the 1980s, presidents generally were willing to defer to
athletics personnel for the decision-making and basic operation of
major intercollegiate athletic programs. In the early 1980s, how-
ever, presidents started to become more sensitive to economic pres-
sures and issues of academic integrity stemming from the operation
of their respective athletic programs. As a result, presidents collec-
tively sought to assert increasing power in the governance of the
NCAA.
1. The 1980s and the Rise of Presidential Involvement
By 1984, the rise of presidential involvement in college athlet-
ics was apparent, as reflected by D.J. Dijulia, Commissioner of the
Metro Atlantic Athletic Conference, who stated that "[t]he best
change in intercollegiate athletics over the past five years has been
the increased involvement of chief executive officers at many, many
institutions."8 In the early 1980s, a group of presidents, largely
from institutions with major intercollegiate athletic programs, saw
the need to collaborate at a national level. 9 In January 1984, those
8. Thoughts of the Day: Freshman Eligibility, NCAA NEWS, Dec. 6, 1999 (noting
college presidents "are in position to enforce institutional policy and set the tone
for athletics programs"), available at http://www.ncaa.org/news/1999/19991206/
active/3625n34.html.
9. See Smith, Presidents Commission, supra note 4, at 427-28. After becoming
concerned about academic integrity and economic issues related to the operation
of intercollegiate athletics at their individual institutions, presidents recognized
the need to exercise more collective control within the NCAA governance struc-
ture. See id. This phenomenon has been summarized as follows:
In the 1980s, during an era when funding for higher education from all
sources was tightening and when many institutions were faced with the
possibility of decreasing enrollments, a group of presidents or chief exec-
utive officers from a number of major institutions belonging to the NCAA
found themselves under intense pressure to deal with a perceived crisis
with integrity in the operation of intercollegiate athletics programs at
their respective institutions. Successful athletics programs arguably...
brought material rewards to institutions in the form of increased alumni
support and increased applications for admissions. However, while zeal-
ous alumni and boosters reveled in their respective alma mater's success
on the athletic field, and prospective students were enticed or at least
encouraged by the same success, faculty and related academic organiza-
tions were often troubled by what they viewed to be an imbalance or per-
haps even a perversion in emphasis between athletic and academic
values. Caught between the demands of these various constituencies, the
presidents resolved to enter the regulatory fray in the intercollegiate ath-
letics context. In doing so, they acknowledged that reform efforts devised
and implemented solely at the institutional level would not suffice to en-
sure the academic integrity of intercollegiate athletics at the most corn-
(Vol. 10: p. 297
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presidents concerned established the Presidents Commission of the
NCAA ("Commission"). 10 At its inception, the Commission's effec-
tiveness was questioned due to a lack of authority; however, active
perseverance and diligence by the group dispelled such beliefs.1'
In fact, the Commission's presidents exerted their influence
and were able to convene a special convention of the NCAA in June
1985. There, they took significant steps designed to achieve greater
academic integrity in the operation of intercollegiate athletics. 12
Specifically, President John W. Ryan of Indiana University-Bloom-
ington, who presided over the Commission and ultimately became
president of the NCAA, reflected on the successes of the 1985 con-
vention: "[T]hink about the impossibility of what the Presidents
Commission [did] in just one year.""' Moreover, Doug Tucker, a
sportswriter for the Associated Press, also acknowledged the ascen-
dancy of the Commission, as evidenced in the special convention of
1985, by emphasizing, " It] here is no doubt who is running the show
in college sports. It's the college presidents."' 14
Finally, in 1986, Walter Byers, who then served as Executive
Director of the NCAA, acknowledged the increasing influence of
the Commission by suggesting that college presidents were begin-
petitive levels. Rather, concerted and cooperative effort on the part of all
similarly situated institutions was required.
Smith, Presidents Commission, supra note 4, at 427 (footnotes omitted).
10. See Rodney K. Smith, The National Collegiate Athletic Association's Death Pen-
alty: How Educators Punish Themselves and Others, 62 IND. L.J. 985, 986-87 (1987)
[hereinafter Death Penalty] (describing how chief executive officers of NCAA insti-
tutions formed Presidents Commission of NCAA to address policy making and is-
sues concerning college sports).
11. See id. at 987. Notably:
When the Presidents Commission initially was formed it was not given
veto power over NCAA actions, and, as a result, many believed that it
would remain "little more than an advisory panel, with limited authority
to review NCAA activity, sponsor charges in rules at conventions, and call
special conventions." Such doubts, however, quickly were dispelled. Act-
ing promptly upon its formation, the Presidents Commission circulated a
survey to the chief executive officers of all NCAA member institutions.
Based on the results of their [sic] survey, the Presidents Commission pro-
posed a seven point plan for consideration at a special Convention to be
held during the summer of 1985 .... designed as a major step toward
restoring integrity to amateur athletics within the NCAA's jurisdiction.
Id.
12. See id. at 997. In particular, the presidents strengthened sanctions for
improper conduct of intercollegiate athletics and set in motion the concept of
what eventually became the institutional certification or review process as we know
it today. See id. at 1026-56 (describing specific punishments for all intercollegiate
athletic actors).
13. Id. at 997.
14. Id.
2003]
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ning to change the course of college athletics.1 5 Director Byers was
correct when he nonetheless questioned whether the Presidents
Commission could maintain the momentum necessary to sustain its
influence.
Emboldened by its successes in helping to ensure academic in-
tegrity through strengthened sanctions adopted during the 1985
convention, the Commission turned to the second major issue it
believed must be addressed-cost-containment-and called an-
other special convention in the summer of 1987. The Commission
proposed a series of cost-containment techniques and sparked na-
tional dialogue concerning the future of college sports.' 6 In prof-
fering its cost-containment proposals, which included cutting
coaches and scholarships in certain sports, the Commission faced
strong opposition from well-known coaches and powerful athletics
directors, and thus, was unsuccessful in achieving its objectives.' 7
The Commission, comprised of college presidents with experience
in crisis management and quick decision-making skills required by
their roles at the campus level, was nonetheless unsuccessful in its
cost-containment efforts due simply to lack of preparation, both
substantively and organizationally.' From this setback, it became
15. SeeJack McCallum, In the Kingdom of the Solitay Man, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED,
Oct. 6, 1986, at 68. See id. In particular:
That's where the big effort is being made right now . . . with the
[P]residents' [C]ommission. This involvement ... augers well for the
future, but it [also] marks one of the most significant developments in a
number of years. The CEOs are determined to change the course of in-
tercollegiate athletics. I feel good about this, and, if this effort maintains
its momentum, the future looks better than it [did] say, five years ago.
Id.
16. See Smith, Presidents Commission, supra note 4, at 429 (explaining how Com-
mission hoped to build upon progress made in 1985).
17. See id. at 430-36 (describing how, despite such efforts, 1987 convention
thought to be less successful as opposed to 1985 convention).
18. See id. at 436. The presidents were inadequately prepared on the sub-
stance of the issues raised:
It is clear from reading the minutes of the proceedings [of the special
Convention in the summer of 1987] that the coaches and others directly
affected by the cost cutting proposals were far better prepared than the
presidents .... Indeed, the best argument that the presidents seemed to
offer was an argument based on a recent survey in which seventy-two per-
cent of the presidents of Division I schools favored cutting the number of
coaching personnel. While such an argument is little better than an ipse
dixit, the presidents seemed incapable of offering much more in support
of their legislative proposals.
Id. (footnotes omitted). On the organization front:
When the momentum of the meeting turned against [the presidents],
they were unable or unprepared to react. The only portion of their pro-
posed legislative agenda that they were able to salvage was the postpone-
ment of the ultimate determination of a number of issues pending
[Vol. 10: p. 297
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evident that the Commission had to strengthen its organizational
presence in the NCAA and find efficient ways to obtain the kind of
substantive information that would enable it to have greater influ-
ence on both the academic integrity and economic (cost-contain-
ment) fronts.
Despite the fact that the Commission enjoyed some success in
the 1987 convention, its defeat on cost-containment issues made it
clear that the presidents had to establish a process that would en-
able them to obtain the kinds of information they knew to be vital
in sustaining their leading role in the governance of intercollegiate
athletics. The presidents also knew that they needed organizational
support to assist them in this effort. 19 President Wilford Bailey
opened the 1987 convention by indicating that the Commission was
initiating an "eighteen-month [national dialogue] designed to ad-
dress questions relating to fundamental principles [in] intercollegi-
ate athletics."2 1 This dialogue commenced during the convention
and continued throughout the 1980s and the 1990s. 21 In addition
to addressing related fundamental principles of college sports, the
proposed dialogue also assisted in gathering and evaluating infor-
mation pertinent to governing big-time intercollegiate athletics.
As a result, the scope of difficulties that the NCAA and its
members were facing, both academic and economic, became in-
creasingly evident from the Commission's stimulated empirical re-
search into problems raised by concerned parties. Indeed, "[i]n
1989, the Knight Foundation, supported by a $2 million grant from
the Knight-Ridder newspaper chain . . . call[ed] for significant re-
forms that included more presidential involvement and control. '22
further studies (an effective admission that they failed to do their home-
work before the meeting). As to their lack of organizational preparation,
Robert Atwell, President of the American Council on Education, pointed
out the presidents faux pas of having put to a vote an issue without first
having their "votes counted" and their "precincts organized." Atwell ad-
ded that in order to pass their legislative program, the presidents should
have done a great deal of lobbying beforehand.
Id. at 437 (footnotes omitted).
19. See id. at 437 n.64. Presidents typically need significant organizational or
personnel support in obtaining and processing information on a myriad of fronts,
one of which is the operation and governance of intercollegiate athletics. As presi-
dents, they have so much on their administrative plates that they must be highly
informed generalists-generalists who have the personnel support necessary to
provide them with and help evaluate information that must be processed in mak-
ing critical decisions.
20. Id. at 439 (stating sixth special convention opened on June 29, 1987).
21. See Smith, Presidents Commission, supra note 4, at 439-55 (detailing summary
of dialogue that occurred during special convention in June 1987).
22. Hawes, Presidential Era, supra note 4.
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The Knight Commission, which included individuals who were pow-
erful both inside and outside the NCAA, "was [col-chaired by Wil-
liam C. Friday, president emeritus of the University of North
Carolina[-]Chapel Hill, and Theodore M. Hesburgh, president
emeritus of the University of Notre Dame .*..."23 Ultimately, the
Knight Commission prepared three reports. 24 Kay Hawes recently
pointed out that "[t]he commission's first report laid out the
problems facing college sports and proposed a new model, known
as the 'one plus three,' which consisted of presidential control di-
rected three ways: toward academic integrity, financial integrity and
accountability through independent certification." 25 In its final re-
port, the Knight Commission also called for cooperation between
college sports administrators and university presidents. 265 Accord-
ingly, the Knight Commission recommended some specific substan-
tive reform proposals, including a series of proposals related to
academic integrity, financial integrity, and certification of athletic
programs at the institutional level.2 7 The work of the Knight Com-
23. Id. (describing how Knight Foundation Commission promoted presiden-
tial activity in college sports throughout 1990s).
24. See id. (averring that reports initiated reform).
25. Id. The Knight Commission's proposed actions to increase presidential
power included endorsements and the reaffirming of presidential control in gov-
erning the athletic department. See id.
26. See SHULMAN & BOWEN, supra note 4, at 1. The authors concluded: "It was
once possible for college sports administrators on the one hand, and university
presidents and trustees on the other, to evade responsibility for the difficulties of
intercollegiate athletics. Each side could plausibly claim the other possessed au-
thority to act. That claim no long holds water." Id.
27. See 2000 NCAA REVIEW OF PRINCIPLES IDENTIFIED BY THE KNIGHT FOUNDA-
TION COMMISSION ON INTERCOLLEGIArE ATHLETICS (Aug. 22, 2000) (summarizing
Knight Commission proposals and assessing progress made since 1991), available at
http://www.ncaa.org/databases/knight-commission/2000-knigh treview.pdf.
The Knight Commission raised the following issues in the academic integrity area:
[1.] The NCAA should strengthen initial-eligibility requirements. The
NCAA should study the feasibility of requiring the range of abilities of the
entire freshman class....
[2.] The NCAA should strengthen initial-eligibility requirements. By
1995, initial eligibility should be based on a 2.000 average in 15 units of
high-school academic work and a combined score of 700 on the SAT or
17 on the ACT....
[3.] The NCAA should strengthen initial-eligibility requirements. Junior
college transfers who did not meet Proposition 48 requirements (initial-
eligibility standards) on graduating from high school should "sit out" a
year of competition after transfer. ...
[4.] The NCAA should strengthen initial-eligibility requirements. High-
school student-athletes should be ineligible for reimbursed campus visits
(or signing letters of intent) until they show reasonable promise of being
able to meet degree requirements. ...
[5.] The letter of intent should serve the student as well as the athletics
department.
[Vol. 10: p. 297
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mission bridged the 1980s and the early 1990s and was a harbinger
of increasing presidential involvement in the NCAA during the
1990s.
2. The 1990s: The Momentum Toward Presidential Accountability
Continues
In the early 1990s many of the specific reforms recommended
by the Knight Commission were adopted by the NCAA.28 Those
[6.] Athletics scholarships should be offered for a five-year period ....
[7.] Athletics eligibility should depend on progress toward a degree ....
[8.] Graduation rates of student-athletes should be a criterion for NCAA
certification....
Id. at 5-9. The Knight Commission's financial integrity issues included:
[1.] Athletics costs must be reduced, and cost control measures adopted
in 1991 must not be "fine tuned" out of existence....
[2.] Athletics grants-in-aid should cover the cost of attendance for the
very needy....
[3.] The independence of athletics foundations and booster clubs must
be curbed....
[4.] The NCAA formula for sharing television revenue must be reviewed
by university presidents....
[5.] All athletically related coaches' income should be reviewed and ap-
proved by the university....
[6.] Coaches should be offered long-term contracts....
[7.] Institutional support should be available for intercollegiate
athletics....
Id. at 10-13. Three issues related to certification of athletics programs were high-
lighted by the Knight Commission: "[1.] The NCAA should extend the certifica-
tion process to all institutions granting athletics aid[;] . . .[2.] Universities should
undertake comprehensive, annual policy audits for their athletics program[; and]
... [3.] The certification program should include the major themes advanced by
the Knight Commission (i.e., the 'one-plus-three' model)." Id. at 14-15.
28. See id. at 1-15 (delineating Knight Commission's recommendations and
the response of NCAA to each of them). While introducing such achievements,
Cedric Dempsey, NCAA President, stated:
In 1991, the Knight Foundation Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics
issued a landmark report in which it called for a new model for the gov-
ernance of college sports. Since then, the NCAA has addressed the Com-
mission's "one-plus-three" model that uses presidential control to achieve
academic integrity, fiscal integrity and independent certification of inter-
collegiate athletics programs. This report will show what the concerns of
the Knight Commission Foundation were when the original report was
developed and what the NCAA has done in response. I am proud of the
reform initiatives that have been implemented by our Association. In the
last decade, we have fundamentally changed our system of governance in
a way that makes presidents directly responsible for the administration of
college athletics. We have made positive changes to our academic eligi-
bility standards that have resulted in higher graduation rates. We created
a Division I athletics certification program that has resulted in self-exami-
nation and outside review of the athletics program at every Division I
member institution.
Id. at 2.
2003]
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reforms further enhanced presidential involvement in the govern-
ance and operation of big-time intercollegiate athletics.
Prior to the publication of the Knight Commission Report, the
Commission received the results of a study it initiated in 1989,
which indicated that the major complaint of student-athletes was
that practices, travel, and conditioning schedules made it difficult
for athletes to be successful as students.2 9 The results of that survey
invoked the calling of a major summit in June 1990. That summit
included thirty-eight of forty-four members of the Commission and
the NCAA's Student-Athlete Advisory Committee."" Armed with
the information provided by the survey and acting in concert with
student-athlete leaders, the Commission was determined to adopt a
series of reforms at the January 1990 and 1991 annual NCAA
meetings. 31
The Commission enjoyed some success in the 1990 NCAA Con-
vention, including the adoption of the requirements to reduce time
demands on student-athletes and to publish the graduation rates of
Division I student-athletes by 1991. In the January 1991 annual
meeting, the Commission continued to make progress by initiating
the passage of legislation focusing on cutting costs, reducing time
demands on student-athletes, and strengthening division member-
ship criteria.3 2 After the 1991 convention, Richard Schultz, who
was then serving as Executive Director of the NCAA concluded: "I
don't think this is a shot in the dark for the presidents ... I think
they have genuine enthusiasm to see that important changes are
made in intercollegiate athletics and that intercollegiate athletics
takes its rightful position in higher education." 33 When the gradua-
tion rates became available in July 1991, they told a sobering story:
29. See Hawes, Presidential Era, supra note 4 (indicating that 1989 study initi-
ated reform).
30. See id. (explaining how historic plan to restore "academic integrity" in col-
lege meetings marked first time in NCAA history that student-athlete formally
represented).
31. See id. "After listening to the concerns of the student-athletes, the presi-
dents left the meeting vowing to present legislation at the 1991 NCAA Convention
in Nashville that would help limit time demands on student-athletes." Id.
32. See id. Indeed, this convention has been referred to as the "Reform Con-
vention," marking the birth of the "20-hour rule," which limited a student-athlete's
time spent each week in athletics-related matters to twenty hours. See id. Moreo-
ver, cost-containment legislation limited the size of coaching staffs, established a
"restricted-earnings" coaching position (which was successfully challenged in a sig-
nificant lawsuit), phased-in a reduction in the number of scholarships, and restruc-
tured legislation that more clearly defined the divisions between institutions
participating in intercollegiate athletics at varying levels of competitiveness. See id.
33. Id.
10
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In July 1991, NCAA research verified the fears of many
people: just because student-athletes received a scholar-
ship and played ball did not mean they graduated. Foot-
ball and men's basketball student-athletes graduated at a
42.1 percent rate, compared to 45.7 for the rest of student-
athletes. For minority students, the problem was more
alarming: only 26.6 percent of black student-athletes grad-
uated, compared to 52.3 percent for whites.3 4
In 1992, the Commission responded by advocating a reform agenda
that included Proposal 16, calling for an initial-eligibility index that
was eventually approved by a substantial majority.35 Moreover,
graduation rates for student-athletes increased after the passage of
Proposal 48, which was strongly supported by the Commission and
required more stringent entrance and participation requirements
for student-athletes. 36
Furthermore, in NCAA v. Tarkanian,37 the United States Su-
preme Court held that the NCAA was not a state actor for purposes
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 8 The Court's holding freed the
NCAA from defending against allegations that it had violated
Coach Jerry Tarkanian's due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution. Even though the NCAA was victo-
rious in Tarkanian, concerns over the NCAA's moral and legal obli-
gations in the due process area persisted. 9 Given these concerns,
the Commission decided to form a "Special Committee" ("Commit-
tee") to make recommendations regarding changes afforded to
coaches, student-athletes, and institutions in the infractions pro-
cess. 4° It is not surprising that the presidents picked Rex Lee, one
34. Kay Hawes, Opportunity vs. Exploitation? Concerns over Standards and Higher-
Education Access Sparked Debates in '90s, NCAA NEWS, Dec. 20, 1999 [hereinafter
Concerns over Standards], available at http://www.ncaa.org/news/1999/19991220/
active/3626n28.html.
35. See NCAA Time Line - 1990-1999, NCAA NEWS, Dec. 20, 1999 [hereinafter
NCAA Time Line], available at http://www.ncaa.org/news/1999/19991220/active/
3626n27.html. Ultimately, the publication of graduation rates would provide the
impetus for significant reform in the future.
36. See id.; see also Hawes, Concerns over Standards, supra note 34 (describing
how Proposal 48 required student-athlete to maintain set minimum GPA and post
set standardized test scores).
37. 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
38. See id. at 198 ("NCAA enjoyed no governmental powers to facilitate its
investigation ... to subpoena witness, to impose contempt sanctions, or to assert
sovereign authority over any individual.") (footnote omitted).
39. See Rodney K. Smith, A Brief History of the National Collegiate Athletic Associa-
tion's Role in Regulating Intercollegiate Athletics, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 9, 17 (2000).
40. See id. at 17-19 (explaining that over time, presidents were compelled to
reform NCAA's enforcement process).
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of their own number, to chair the Committee. 4' Subsequently, the
Committee made major recommendations to the NCAA, which
transformed the infractions process. 42
In the 1993 convention, the Commission was again successful
in guiding a few major reforms through the legislative process, in-
cluding the development "of a Division I athletics certification pro-
gram; and the establishment of an NCAA Initial-Eligibility
Clearinghouse. ' 43 The central purpose of the certification process,
which serves a function similar to that of accreditation, is "to vali-
date the fundamental integrity of member institutions' athletics
programs through a verified and evaluated institutional self-study.
The involvement of peer reviewers external to the institution shall
provide the verification and evaluation of the methodology and re-
sults of the self-study. '44 This certification process, which is now in
its second round of site visits, requires that Division I universities
take a close institutional look at the operations of intercollegiate
athletics programs on their campuses. This process also provides
other means, at the institutional level, for presidents to obtain nec-
essary information. In 1993, presidents took an active role in a
number of other matters, including the hiring of a new Executive
Director for the NCAA, the accepting of a major report from the
Gender-Equity Task Force, and the creation of a committee chaired
by Chancellor Charles E. Young of the University of California at
Los Angeles, to determine the advisability of developing a Division
I-A football championship. 45
The presidents continued to be quite active in 1994, although
their major efforts were at the committee level, where they were
involved in studying the organizational structure of the NCAA.46
Ultimately, the Division I Task Force recommended a structural
41. See id. at 17-18.
42. See id. at 18-19 (stating that report was issued in 1991 containing basic
recommendations concerning infractions process).
43. NCAA Time Line, supra note 35 (noting Clearinghouse became operational
in August of 1993).
44. 2002-03 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 22.01 (2002), available at http://
www.ncaa.org/library/membership/division-i-manual/2002-03/index.html. The
certification process is set forth in Articles 22.01-22.5 of the NCAA Bylaws.
45. See NCAA Time Line, supra note 35 (stating definitive goal of Gender-Eq-
uity Task Force is male/female athletics participation substantially proportionate
to overall student body, but noting that participation, efforts, and interests tests of
Title IX regulation are appropriate tests for equitable participation).
46. See id. In 1994, the Special Committee to Review Initial-Eligibility Stan-
dards also recommended new Division I standards essentially based on eliminating
test-score endpoints. See id. The proposal, however, was defeated at the 1995 con-
vention. See id.
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model that moved away from the one-institution, one-vote means of
governance to a model that provided for federation among the
three divisions-Divisions 1, 11, and III. 47 When finally adopted in
1997, this restructured model provided more presidential input re-
garding major intercollegiate athletics at the Division I level. In
1994, the Division I presidents also worked with the NCAA and en-
tered a $1.725 billion, eight-year television contract with CBS. This
lucrative agreement, and the even more lucrative one that followed
it in 2001, provided a substantial source of funds, which could be
used to fund the expanding operations of the NCAA, as well as ma-
jor Division I conferences and institutions.41 It also ensured that
the commercialization of big-time intercollegiate athletics would
continue unabated.
Issues regarding gender equity drew much of the presidents'
and the NCAA's attention in 1995 and 1996, and continued to be of
substantial concern at the campus level. From 1992 through 1996,
a highly publicized gender equity case involving Brown University
captured the attention of those involved in the administration of
intercollegiate athletics. In 1996, the First Circuit issued an opin-
ion upholding the lower court's determination that Brown Univer-
sity had violated Title IX by failing to provide sufficient
opportunities for women in its intercollegiate athletics programs.
The court also provided Brown University with an opportunity to
submit a further gender equity plan for consideration by the lower
court. 49 With the court's decision, it became clear that institutions
would have to provide greater opportunities, with their attendant
economic costs, to women student-athletes. 5° With increased budg-
etary demands in many areas, presidents had to face the spiraling
costs attendant with achieving gender equity in their intercollegiate
47. See id. (noting Division I Task Force to Review NCAA Membership Struc-
ture suggested structural model with almost total federation among three
divisions).
48. See Rodney K. Smith & Robert D. Walker, From Inequity to Opportunity: Keep-
ing the Promises Made to Big-Time Intercollegiate Student Athletes, I NEV. L.J. 160, 160-61
(2001) (stating NCAA had entered into contract that more than doubled annual
payment that it was to receive for television rights to tournament).
49. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 187-88 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding
Brown University's proposed plan fell short of good faith effort to meet require-
ments of Title IX, but noting court's respect for academic freedom and reluctance
to interject into university affairs, and suggesting that universities be given as much
freedom as possible in conducting their operations consonant with constitutional
and statutory limits).
50. See Rodney K. Smith, When Ignorance Is Not Bliss: In Search of Racial and
Gender Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics, 61 Mo. L. REV. 329, 354-62 (1996). The eco-
nomic implications of such litigation and the demand for gender equity are noted
in that article. See id.
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athletics programs. Few women's athletic programs are revenue-
producing in any significant sense and these costs have placed in-
creased pressure on revenue-producing sports (largely men's bas-
ketball and football at the Division I level) to generate sufficient
revenues to cover much of the expense associated with other non-
revenue-producing sports, including women's sports, which are be-
ing added in response to Title IX. These budgetary issues have ne-
cessitated that all presidents, including those who have been
disinterested or disinclined, to keep a close watch on their intercol-
legiate athletics programs.
With the rise of the budgetary issues associated with achieving
gender equity in intercollegiate athletics and proliferating adminis-
trative and capital expenses in athletics, the effort by presidents to
gain further control of the NCAA's governance process intensified.
In the annual meeting of the NCAA in January 1996, a series of
proposals to restructure the process of governance in earnest were
presented and were supported overwhelmingly by the presidents.5 1
The remainder of the significant restructuring proposals, which
would give presidents even more power within the NCAA, were
adopted and became effective on August 1, 1997.52 With this re-
structuring, the presidents institutionalized their power base in the
NCAA. In particular, the presidents became the exclusive members
of the NCAA Board of Directors.5-3 This eighteen-member board of
directors was given the following significant duties and
responsibilities:
(a) Establish and direct general policy;
(b) Establish a strategic plan;
(c) Adopt administrative bylaws and regulations;
51. See NCAA Time Line, supra note 35. In 1996, the presidents adopted a
membership restructuring plan that did away with the one-school, one-vote con-
cept and moved to a representative form of government, in which conferences
would represent their member institutions and cast their votes on behalf of confer-
ence members. See Rick Bay, Power Distorted in New NCAA Structure, NCAA NEws,
Feb. 18, 2002, available at http://www.ncaa.org/news/2OO2/2O020218/editorial/
3904n33.html.
52. See 2002-03 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 44, at art. 4 (stating
NCAA's administrative structure includes Executive Committee, comprised of in-
stitutional chief executive officers (CEOs), that oversees Association-wide issues
and ensures that each division operates consistent with basic purposes, fundamen-
tal policies, and general principles of Association). Furthermore, the new "admin-
istrative structure of each division . . . empower[s] a body of institutional chief
executive officers (CEOs) to set forth the policies, rules and regulations for operat-
ing the division." Id. at art. 4.01.1.
53. See id. at art. 4.2.1 (establishing minimal goal that NCAA Board of Direc-
tors composition include at least one person who is ethnic minority and at least
one person of each gender).
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(d) Adopt operating bylaws and rules and/or delegate
limited legislative powers to the Management Council;
(e) Delegate to the Management Council responsibilities
for specific matters it deems appropriate;
(f) Ratify, amend or rescind the actions of the Manage-
ment Council;
(g) Assure that there is gender and ethnic diversity among
its membership, the membership of the Management
Council (see Constitution, Article 4.5) and the member-
ship of each of the other bodies in the administrative
structure;
(h) Require bodies in the administrative structure to alter
(but not expand) their membership to achieve diversity;
(i) Approve an annual budget;
(j) Approve regulations providing for the expenditure of
funds and the distribution of income consistent with the
provisions of [the] Constitution;
(k) Approve regulations providing for the administration
of championships; and
(1) Advise the Executive Committee concerning the em-
ployment of the Association's chief executive officer (e.g.,
president) and concerning the oversight of his or her
employment. 54
It is clear that restructuring made the presidents the sole partici-
pants in the major governing body in the NCAA, giving them ulti-
mate control over rules, the budget, and even the hiring of the
NCAA's chief executive officer. After restructuring, no one
doubted that the presidents were firmly in control of big-time inter-
collegiate athletics within Division I of the NCAA.55
Once power within the NCAA was formally consolidated in the
presidents, they increasingly assumed control of the NCAA's legisla-
tive and administrative processes.56 Changes in rules or other ma-
54. Id. at art. 4.2.2.
55. See id. at fig. 4-1 (placing board of directors at top of NCAA's governance
hierarchy).
56. A recent NCAA publication notes:
For more than 90 years, college presidents have sought to 'take charge' of
intercollegiate athletics. The NCAA has met that challenge in two pri-
mary ways: by creating an Executive Committee composed entirely of col-
lege chief executive officers and by establishing boards of institutional
CEOs to oversee the business of each division. College presidents, who
are responsible for the fulfillment of their institutions' missions, now are
mandated by the NCAA constitution to lead and influence the activities
of the Association. Intercollegiate athletics and higher education - for
2003]
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jor actions all have to be approved or ratified by the board of
directors. The rise of presidential power within the NCAA has been
summarized as follows:
In each subsequent year of the 1990s, the presidents seem-
ingly exercised more influence as they supported changes
in academic standards, financial aid and gender equity.
Then with the completion of NCAA governance restruc-
turing in 1997, presidents found their role expanded
again with the creation of Presidents Councils (called the
Board of Directors in Division I) in each newly federated
division, where they would wield more control over the As-
sociation than ever before .5 7
These changes in the governance structure have been characterized
as follows:
Though the structure is designed to enhance the role of
college and university presidents, athletics administrators
will continue to play the primary role for the maintenance
of college sports and, in most cases, for developing the leg-
islation that presidents will consider. The change from
the previous governance structure is greatest in Division I,
where the one-institution, one-vote principle has been set
aside in favor of a legislative system based on conference
representation. Legislation in the future will be approved
by a Board of Directors, composed entirely of Division I
presidents, rather than by a vote of the entire Division I
membership at the NCAA Convention. 58
Directors of athletics, faculty athletics representatives, and others
have expressed concern regarding the concentration of legislative
and other power in the presidents and conferences under this new
governance structure within the NCAA. For example, the Division
I-A Athletic Directors Association recently released the results of a
"governance study" (a survey of Division I-A athletic directors and
faculty athletics representatives), which noted dissatisfaction on the
part of directors of athletics and faculty athletics representatives
decades, a strained alliance often compromised by conflicting objectives
- now share common leadership and an uncommon opportunity to move
forward as one.
2002 NCAA AD Hoc REVIEw COMMI-rEE REPOwr 3 (2002), available at http://
www.ncaa.org/library/membership/ad_hoc_report/ad-hoc-report.pdf.
57. Hawes, Presidential Era, supra note 4.
58. Looking Back: The House the NCAA Built, NCAA NEWS, Aug. 13, 2001, availa-
ble at http://www.ncaa.org/inews/2001/20010813/briefly.html.
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with the 1997 changes in the NCAA's governance structure.5 9 A
summary of that memorandum noted that "[a] high percentage of
respondents are satisfied with the president-driven Board of Direc-
tors having final authority to approve legislation. '60 Nevertheless,
the survey found that "[a]lmost 100 percent of the respondents are
not comfortable with the current legislative process, and an equally
high percentage of respondents prefer the former legislative pro-
cess that was in place before 1997."61 Interestingly, "[a]lmost 100
percent of [the] respondents indicated their president/chancellor
is less informed and involved now than ... before 1997, and that a
majority of the presidents/chancellors did attend the NCAA Con-
vention before restructuring. '62 Thus, while there was apparent sat-
isfaction with having a board of directors made up of presidents, it
is clear that directors of athletics and faculty athletics representa-
tives at the Division I-A level are endeavoring to develop a case for
returning to the pre-1997 legislative process, which involved indi-
viduals other than the presidents.
Despite these objections to the new governance structure, par-
ticularly on the grounds that the conferences have gained undue
power, the presidents remain firmly in control.63 The presidents
have moved forward on a number of fronts since 1997. In addition
to efforts in the legislative area, the presidents, through the board
of directors and the Executive Committee, have been very involved
in the budgetary and revenue-producing aspects of the NCAA. On
August 9, 2002, the NCAA Executive Committee, made up of presi-
dents from the membership of the Association, approved a
$422,233,000 budget for the 2002 to 2003 fiscal year.64 This consti-
tutes a $75 million increase over the budget for the 2001 to 2002
59. See Dutch Baughman, Single Cycle May Cure Division I Legislative Ills, NCAA
NEWS, Dec. 23, 2002, available at http://www.ncaa.org/news/2002/20021223/edi-
torial/3926n32.html.
60. Id.
61. Id. The survey also revealed that "[a]lmost 100 percent of the respon-
dents believe [d] their institutional vote was more meaningful in the former legisla-
tive process [prior to 1997]." Id.
62. Id.
63. Presidents exert significant power at the conference level in all major ar-
eas, including hiring of the conference commissioner, adopting rules and regula-
tions for the conference, and allocating conference funds.
64. See Executive Committee Approves Operating Budget of $422.2 Million, NCAA
NEws, Aug. 19, 2002 (stating Division I distributions, which include newly estab-
lished $17 million student-athlete opportunity fund, will increase by about $63.3
million or thirty-five percent), available at http://www.ncaa.org/news/2002/2002
0819/active/3917n01. The championship revenue budget is also expected to in-
crease by about $1.5 million generated by ticket revenue in men's and women's
basketball, baseball, men's ice hockey, and wrestling. See id.
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year. This dramatic 17.76% increase was fueled by a $6 billion
agreement with CBS Sports for the right to televise the NCAA
Men's Basketball Championship and other championship events,
and the agreement provides for significant increased payments to
the NCAA on an annual basis.65
The presidents have exercised their new power within the
NCAA in both an economic and a legislative sense. What is less
clear is whether they will be held accountable for the governance of
big-time intercollegiate athletics at the institutional level also.
III. PRESIDENTIAL RESPONSIBILITY AT THE INSTITUTIONAL LEVEL
Growth of presidential responsibility for the governance of in-
tercollegiate athletics within the NCAA has not been matched by a
concomitant increase in responsibility at the institutional level.
Presidents ultimately control economic and legislative matters
within the NCAA governance hierarchy, but historically, they have
not been held directly responsible within the NCAA's infractions
process for the operation of their athletics program at the institu-
tional level. There are, however, some encouraging indications
that presidents increasingly will be held accountable and may even-
tually be sanctioned directly in the infractions process for failure to
take responsibility at the institutional level.
A. Presidential Responsibility for Lack of Institutional Control
The most likely grounds for which a president will be held ac-
countable in the NCAA infractions process-the process by which
the NCAA has penalized and effectively required the removal of
coaches and other personnel-is lack of institutional control.
There are other areas in which a president may be penalized, in-
cluding academic fraud and inappropriate work with boosters or
donors, but the greatest area of direct responsibility for the office of
the president is that of institutional control.
Article 2.1.1 of the NCAA Division I Manual indicates that a
president is responsible for maintaining control of the athletics pro-
gram at the institutional level:
65. See EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF CBS AGREEMENT (Dec. 9, 1999), available at
http://www.ncaa.org/databases/reports/I/200004bd/200004_dl board_
agenda s04 a01.htm. The report states that $40 million would be payable up-
front, with the first year of the contract totaling $360 million. See id. This figure
will escalate eight percent per year through the final year of the contract (2012-
2013) to approximately $800 million. See id.
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It is the responsibility of each member institution to con-
trol its intercollegiate athletics program in compliance
with the rules and regulations of the Association. The in-
stitution's chief executive officer is responsible for the administra-
tion of all aspects of the athletics program, including approval
of the budget and audit of all expenditures. 66
The scope of that responsibility is extensive: "The institution's re-
sponsibility for the conduct of its intercollegiate athletics program
includes responsibility for the actions of its staff members and for
the actions of any other individual or organization engaged in activ-
ities promoting the athletics interests of the institution. '67 Institu-
tional control is further delineated in Article 6.01.1:
"Administrative control or faculty control, or a combination of the
two, shall constitute institutional control. '68 Article 6.1.1 adds: "A
member institution's chief executive officer has ultimate responsi-
bility and final authority for the conduct of the intercollegiate ath-
letics program and the actions of any board in control of that
program. '"69 These provisions make it clear that the president is
responsible for maintaining institutional control, which is broadly
defined.
The principle of rules compliance, set forth in Article 2.8 of
the NCAA Division I Manual, provides that:
Each institution shall comply with all applicable rules and
regulations of the Association in the conduct of its inter-
collegiate athletics programs. It shall monitor its pro-
grams to assure compliance and to identify and report to
the Association instances in which compliance has not
been achieved. In any such instance, the institution shall
cooperate fully with the Association and shall take appro-
priate corrective actions. Members of an institution's staff,
student-athletes, and other individuals and groups repre-
senting the institution's athletics interests shall comply
with the applicable Association rules, and the member in-
stitution shall be responsible for such compliance. 70
66. 2002-03 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 44, at art. 2.1.1 (emphasis
added).
67. Id. at art. 2.1.2.
68. Id. at art. 6.01.1.
69. Id. at art. 6.1.1.
70. Id. at art. 2.8.1. The Association has the additional responsibility of "as-
sist[ing] the institution in its efforts to achieve full compliance with all rules and
regulations and . . . afford[ing] the institution, its staff and student-athletes fair
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Article 2.8.3 further provides: "An institution found to have vio-
lated the Association's rules shall be subject to such disciplinary and
corrective actions as may be determined by the Association." 7 1 Vio-
lations by institutional staff members "shall be subject to discipli-
nary or corrective action as set forth in the provisions of the NCAA
enforcement procedures, whether such violations occurred at the
certifying institution or during the individual's previous employ-
ment at another member institution."7 2 Institutional staff, includ-
ing presidents, may be penalized: (1) by corrective action taken by
the institution, in conjunction with the institution's or a confer-
ence's self-reporting of a violation; and (2) by penalties imposed in
the NCAA's enforcement process after an infraction of the Associa-
tion's rules is reported or discovered. 73
A lack of institutional control is generally considered to be a
major infraction and, as such, carries with it an array of possible
penalties, including for example: (1) prohibition on off-campus
recruiting; (2) suspension of a head coach or other staff member
for one or more competitions; (3) public reprimand (only in situa-
tions where it has been determined that a penalty, in addition to
any institutional-determined or conference-determined penalty, is
warranted); and (4) when a staff member (e.g., a president) has
been found to be in violation at a prior institution (an institution
where the president previously served and committed a violation),
the new institution must show cause why a penalty or additional
sanction should be imposed on that new institution if it does not
take appropriate disciplinary or corrective action against the institu-
tional employee (the president in our case). 74 Under the rules,
procedures in the consideration of an identified or alleged failure in compliance."
Id. at art. 2.8.2.
71. 2002-03 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 44, at art. 2.8.3.
72. Id. at art. 19.01.4. The nature of the penalty structure follows the central
principle that "penalties imposed under NCAA enforcement policies and proce-
dures should be broad and severe if the violation or violations reflect a general
disregard for the governing rules." Id. at art. 19.01.5. Furthermore, "[p]revious
violations of NCAA legislation shall be a contributing factor in determining the
degree of penalty." Id.
73. See id. at art. 19.6.1-2. These two means of penalizing an individual or an
institution are set forth in Bylaws 19.6.1 (secondary violations) and 19.6.2 (major
violations), each of which states:
The vice president for enforcement services [of the NCAA], upon ap-
proval by the chair or another member of the Committee on Infractions
designated by the chair, or the committee may determine that no penalty
is warranted in a secondary case, that an institutional- or conference-de-
termined penalty is satisfactory or, if appropriate, impose a penalty.
id.
74. See id. at art. 19.6.2.1. The prior rule, 19.6.2.1(d), held that:
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presidents may be penalized personally or through the imposition
of further sanctions on their athletics programs. To date, this has
not occurred in any formal sense, although presidents at programs
that have committed major infractions, such as a lack of institu-
tional control, have resigned or retired, perhaps because they were
under pressure to do so. Under such circumstances, however, if
they take a position at another institution, formal penalties will not
follow them because they were not penalized directly in the infrac-
tions process.
The Committee on Infractions ("COI") and the Infractions Ap-
peals Committee ("IAC") have been edging in the direction of im-
posing formal penalties on a president or an institution because of
an action (or inaction) of a president. A brief look at the cases that
characterize this movement evidences this trend.
In its public appeals report for its decision in a 1996 New Mex-
ico State University case, the IAC of the NCAA referred to the
COI's principle of institutional control:
Not only directors of athletics, but other officials in the
athletics department, the faculty athletics representative,
the head coaches and the other institutional administra-
tors.., are expected to assume a primary role in ensuring
compliance. Even though specific action has been taken
to place responsibility elsewhere .. . [t]heir failure .. .to
prevent violations of NCAA rules will be considered the
result of a lack of institutional control. 75
[A]II institutional staff members determined by the committee knowingly
to have engaged in or condoned a major violation be subject to: (1) ter-
mination of employment; (2) suspension without pay for at least one
year; (3) reassignment of duties within the institution to a position that
does not include contact with prospective or enrolled student-athletes or
representatives of the institution's athletics interests for at least one year;
or (4) other disciplinary action approved by the committee.
1999-00 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 19.6.2.1(d)(1)-(3) (1999). The Committee
on Infractions does, however, maintain broad power to impose penalties under
Article 19.1.3(e), which permits the Committee to "impose an appropriate penalty
or show-cause requirement on a member found to be involved in a major violation
... or recommend to the Board of Directors suspension or termination of mem-
bership." 2002-03 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 44, at art. 19. Thus, de-
spite the fact that the new rule no longer presumptively requires the imposition of
these penalties, including removal from office, it is clear that the Committee on
Infractions, the Infractions Appeals Committee, the president's conference, or an
institutional board of trustees may decide that such a stringent penalty is
appropriate.
75. Infractions Case Appeal: New Mexico State University, NCAA REGISTER, Jan. 6,
1996, available at http://www.ncaa.org/databases/register/register_970203/
infraxnmstate.html.
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The assistant coach argued that, as an individual, he could not vio-
late the principle of institutional control. The IAC expressed some
sympathy for the logic of the coach's argument, but it noted, "the
Committee on Infractions has made several findings of a lack of
institutional control against individuals, primarily head coaches,
none of which has been appealed to the Infractions Appeals Com-
mittee prior to this case." 76 Rather than disturb those findings of
failure to exercise institutional control by individuals, the IAC re-
fused to extend liability for lack of institutional control below the
level of head coach, and summarized its view that " [t] he Infractions
Appeals Committee believes that the principle of institutional con-
trol is intended to place responsibility on the institutional adminis-
tration to establish reasonable procedures, to provide sufficient
personnel and support to make these procedures functional, and to
monitor the procedures in a reasonable manner."77 Thus, individ-
ual head coaches and administrators, including presidents, may be
held accountable for failure to exercise institutional control.
In a 2001 case involving New Mexico State University, a presi-
dent came very close to being held to have violated the institutional
control principle. In that case, the university hired an assistant bas-
ketball coach despite expressions of concern by the university's
compliance director that the coach was tainted by a prior major
violation. After the director of athletics opted to hire the coach,
believing that the two junior college players whom the assistant
coach would bring to New Mexico State made the risk well worth
taking, the compliance director forwarded his strong reservations
to the president, who simply ignored him. The COI:
[F] ound such a lack of response on the part of both offi-
cials [the athletics director and the president] to be aston-
ishing, especially in light of the fact that the university had
just concluded a major infractions case, at the heart of
which were violations associated with men's basketball jun-
ior college transfers and correspondence courses. 78
76. Id. ("Those findings have blurred the line between 'institutional control'
and individual violations."). The New Mexico State case is the first in which the
CO! found an institutional control violation by an assistant coach. See id.
77. Id. (acknowledging that history of institutional control findings against
head coaches exists while also maintaining reservations about applying institu-
tional control findings to any individual). The IAC subsequently determined that
institutional control findings cannot be extended to include assistant coaches, and
vacated the institutional control violation finding against the former New Mexico
State assistant men's basketball coach. See id.
78. See NEW MEXICO STATE UNIVERSITY PUBLIC INFRACTIONS REPORT (June 20,
2001) (stating further revelation that president and director of athletics privately
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Shortly thereafter, the newly hired assistant coach engaged in seri-
ous academic fraud related to his improper efforts, including ar-
ranging to have others complete course work for the athletes, to
ensure that the two athletes would be eligible to play at New Mexico
State University. Despite the egregious nature of the assistant
coach's actions, the presence of other improprieties associated with
the operation of the basketball program, and the clear failure on
the part of the president to exercise institutional control related to
the program, the COI did not make a formal finding of lack of
institutional control. In refusing to find a lack of institutional con-
trol, the COI acknowledged the strong efforts of some university
personnel, adding "I[h] ad the president and director of athletics, who
were in office at the time the assistant coach ... was hired, remained
in their positions, the committee would likely have made a finding of a lack
of institutional control."79 'Therefore, the COI made it clear that the
resignation of the president and the director of athletics made a
major difference in the COI's decision not to find a lack of institu-
tional control. This decision certainly implies a willingness on the
part of the COI to find that a president failed to exercise institu-
tional control. It also implicitly encourages institutions finding
themselves in difficult straits, as was the case with New Mexico State
University, to consider removing top administrators, including per-
haps the president, in taking corrective action as a part of its effort
to self-impose penalties prior to subjecting itself to a hearing before
the COI.
In a later case, the IAC did not deal with the issue of lack of
institutional control in an appeal by the former head basketball
coach at the University of Minnesota, but the IAC affirmed the im-
position of very stringent penalties that effectively ended the col-
legiate career of the head coach. It noted:
The most severe penalties are appropriate when the aca-
demic mission of the university has been compromised.
The former head coach was not the only one who bears
responsibility for the damages; as the Committee on In-
fractions' report demonstrates, others in the program, and
Minnesota itself, also failed in their responsibilities. The
negotiated new contract for head men's basketball coach and did not inform uni-
versity's governing body of this action), available at http://www.ncaa.org/releases/
makepage.cgi/infractions/2001062001in.htm. Both the president and the direc-
tor of athletics at the time were later removed from their positions, but not as part
of a formal sanction. See id.
79. Id. (emphasis added).
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former head coach's appeal is the only one before us. We
have no doubt that his conduct, fully established by the
evidence in this case, justifies the penalty imposed. 0
Failure to exercise adequate institutional control certainly has been
recognized by the IAC, but it was not at issue in the head coach's
appeal. It should be noted also that the president and the director
of athletics at the University of Minnesota had either resigned or
had been asked to resign their positions, which had been done
prior to the IAC's hearing of the case. Their departure was, at least
implicitly, a part of the university's corrective action.
In a recent case involving Bucknell University, the COI and the
LAC made it clear that they were willing to look closely at a presi-
dent's actions in conjunction with their analyses of the institutional
control issue. In the Bucknell case, the COI made a finding of lack
of institutional control. In reaching that conclusion, the COI ob-
served that:
In March 1992, the former president of the institution se-
cured a five-year pledge for annual contributions of $5,000
to the institution's Grappler Club from an athletics repre-
sentative [donor to the athletics program]. The athletics
representative made his first $5,000 payment to the presi-
dent at the time. In February 1994, the president again
visited the athletics representative to discuss his continued
willingness to support the wrestling program. During this
meeting, the athletics representative gave the president
the impression that he was continuing to support the wres-
tling program consistent with his earlier pledge of $5,000
per year, but, for some reason, the contributions were not
being recorded on the institution's records. In a follow-up
letter to the athletics representative dated March 7, 1994,
the former president wrote:
"It was a relief to me to learn that your philan-
thropic involvement with a young wrestler did
not directly include Bucknell. I know that
sounds strange, but the NCAA is a litigious or-
ganization and the relationship between
Bucknell and its other athletic competitors is a
very complex one. Because Bucknell has drawn
80. FORMER HEAD MEN'S BASKETBALL COACH UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, TWIN
CITIES PUBLIC INFRACTIONS APPEALS COMMITTEE REPORT (Apr. 6, 2001) [hereinafter
UNIV. OF MINN. IAC REPORT], available at http://www.ncaa.org/releases/
makepage.cgi/infractions/2001040601in.htm.
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significant attention to itself by being one of the
'cleanest of the clean,' some of our rivals would
enjoy catching us in even a very small infraction
of the rules."
The committee found implausible the president's expla-
nation that this language did not refer to the wrestling stu-
dent-athlete."'
The COI also noted other questionable actions by the university's
development office, which was subject to the oversight of the presi-
dent's office. 8 2
The IAC agreed with the COI's finding of lack of institutional
control. In doing so, the IAC pointed out that:
[T] he committee found there was no institutional process
in place for adequate control of donor contributions and
the award of financial aid to student-athletes. Indeed, very
senior administrative officials working in the development
area became or should have become aware of possible im-
proprieties that should have been subjected to an investi-
gative and reporting process and timely action was not
taken.
From 1992 to 1994, an athletics representative
pledged annual contributions of $5,000 to the Grappler
Club. Although the [donor to the athletics program] in-
sisted that he was supporting the wrestling program
through donations to the Grappler Club, the contribu-
tions were not being recorded in the institution's records.
In a letter from the university's president to the [donor],
the president indicated that he had knowledge of the pos-
sibility of improper payments to a student-athlete as early
as March 1994.83
The president's knowledge of the possibility of improper payments
to a student-athlete certainly contributed to the IAC's holding that
Bucknell lacked institutional control. Indeed, in its concluding ob-
servations regarding the institutional control issue, the IAC stated,
81. BUCKNELL UNIVERSITY INFRACIIONS APPEALS COMMITTEE PUBLIC REPORT
(Mar. 7, 2000), available at http://www.ncaa.org/releases/makepage.cgi/infrac-
tions/2000030701in.htm.
82. See id. (detailing rumors circulating in development office that student-
athlete had received $5,000 from wrestling program athletics representative for
work not actually performed).
83. Id. (adding university unduly delayed its reporting of problems to NCAA
even when serious questions arose).
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"[m]any high-ranking university officials in control of university
policies and procedures were alerted at one time or another to the
questionable activities surrounding the wrestling program but
chose not to deal directly with the situation or to develop proce-
dures to oversee the program."8 4
The president involved in the lack of institutional control in
the Bucknell case was no longer in office at the time of the hearing,
and was not penalized formally for his involvement. Nevertheless,
the message that presidents may be held personally accountable
and directly penalized for an action or inaction is becoming
clearer.
It is also unlikely that presidents will simply be able to distance
themselves from the financing and operation of their athletics pro-
gram by arguing that they should not be personally penalized due
to a lack of actual or subjective knowledge on their part. The LAC
has addressed this knowledge issue in a slightly different context:
We believe that the objective, "should have known" stan-
dard may well be appropriate to assess the responsibility of
a person, such as the head coach of an athletics program,
who is expected to know what those in the program are
doing. To conclude otherwise would be to encourage
coaches or others in similarly responsible positions to close
their eyes and ears to what is happening in areas for which
they are accountable. It would be irresponsible for this
committee, the NCAA, or any other member institution to
tolerate, let alone encourage, such intentional ignorance.
A head coach's responsibility goes beyond merely acting
upon academic fraud that comes to his attention. A coach
should take reasonable steps to see that it does not hap-
pen in the first place. This is not to say that he is abso-
lutely liable for every instance of academic fraud that
might occur; it is to say, however, that his accountability
should be measured by more than what he actually knew.
It should be measured by what a reasonably vigilant, obser-
vant, and diligent person in his position should have
known. If he does nothing to discourage academic fraud,
nothing to observe those circumstances in which it might
be occurring, and nothing to see that those in the pro-
gram are carrying out their responsibilities honestly, he
84. Id. (emphasizing committee's decision that university's violations in com-
bination constitute lack of institutional control is not clearly contrary to evidence).
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should not be shielded from accountability merely be-
cause his inaction insulates him from knowledge of what is
happening. To do so would be to encourage the evasion
of responsibility on the part of those of whom the institu-
tion, the NCAA, and the public expect responsibility.8 5
While this case dealt with academic fraud, its reasoning applies in
the context of lack of institutional control or other areas in which a
president might be held responsible. Certainly, a president should
not be permitted, in a similar case, to avoid responsibility by argu-
ing a lack of actual knowledge regarding a significant series of rules
violations. Indeed, the lack of institutional control principle surely
requires, at a minimum, that a president will endeavor affirmatively
to obtain such information. The very principle of institutional con-
trol, therefore, implies that knowledge must be assumed when a
president fails to obtain information and act upon it. In areas of
presidential responsibility for the governance of intercollegiate ath-
letics at the NCAA and institutional levels, such as the area of insti-
tutional control, presidents should not be able to avoid
responsibility by creating a veil of "institutional ignorance."
It appears evident that the COI and IAC are increasingly open
to the possibility of formally penalizing a president for failing to
exercise his or her responsibility of overseeing intercollegiate ath-
letics at the institutional level. A major area of presidential respon-
sibility is that of institutional control of intercollegiate athletics. If a
president has endeavored, intentionally or otherwise, to distance
him or herself from the operations of intercollegiate athletics at the
institutional level (e.g., ignoring budgetary or academic irregulari-
ties or failing to establish effective administrative mechanisms that
can aid in discovering possible infractions), the president should be
held personally accountable and penalized, by at least being pub-
licly censured.8 6
85. UNIv. OF MINN. IAC REPORT, supra note 80 (emphasis added) (stressing
that head coach's accountability derives from relationship with student-athletes
and responsibility for integrity of program, and not from any relationship with
wrongdoers).
86. If presidents fail to set up an effective monitoring system to oversee ex-
penditures with the athletics budget, they should be held responsible for any in-
fractions that occur in that area. Compare this with the Gonzaga University Public
Infractions Report of 1998, in which the university was held to lack institutional
control because it failed to: (1) detect or prevent the director of athletics from
misappropriating over 100 university-directed checks totaling over $178,000; (2)
identify and monitor instances when the director of athletics misappropriated gate
receipts, parking fees, and program sales receipts received by athletics personnel;
and, (3) otherwise identify and monitor the director of athletics' manipulation of
the departmental budget. See GONZAGA UNIVERSITY PUBLIC INFRACTIONS REPORT
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Presidents might argue that the NCAA should not penalize
them or hold them personally and formally responsible for lack of
institutional control. They could assert that penalizing the institu-
tion effectively, albeit indirectly, penalizes them because they are
the institution's chief executive officers. They might also argue
that, given their ultimate responsibility for the entire institution,
they will be held responsible by the board of trustees or other gov-
erning authority, and by the broader public. Indeed, this might
explain why many presidents resign, under pressure or otherwise,
when their institution is involved in a major infraction of the
NCAA's rules.
There is much irony in these arguments against presidential
accountability and personal penalty. Student-athletes, coaches, and
administrative staff are regularly held responsible and punished for
their involvement in an infraction, even though none of them has
more ultimate responsibility for the oversight of the athletics pro-
gram and budget than an institution's president does. Student-ath-
letes, coaches, and administrative staff are convenient scapegoats,
especially when the institution (under the guidance of the presi-
dent) is endeavoring to make its case that it has engaged in suffi-
cient corrective action and should not be further penalized by the
COI. Sadly, one senses that the lower one is in terms of status or
power within the institutional structure, the more likely it is that he
or she will be made a scapegoat and formally penalized, in hopes
that the NCAA will refrain from penalizing the institution more ag-
gressively. Presidents must accept their fair share of accountability
in the infractions process.
IV. CONCLUSION
Historically, university presidents have exerted increased con-
trol over the governance and operation of intercollegiate athletics
within the NCAA and on their respective campuses. Despite this
dramatic increase in presidential power in the governance of big-
time intercollegiate athletics over the past two decades, the NCAA
has not held the presidents personally and formally accountable for
their actions or inaction in the governance of intercollegiate athlet-
ics at the institutional level. Presidents, ostensibly the most power-
ful and responsible individuals on campus, are, at least in terms of
formal penalties, seeking free rider status-they want the benefits
(July 30, 1998), available at http://www.ncaa.org/releases/makepage.cgi/infrac-
tions/1998070301in.htm. The university was held to have lacked institutional con-
trol, but the president also should have been held personally accountable. See id.
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of responsibility in the governance of intercollegiate athletics at the
Associational and institutional levels, without having to accept full
responsibility for infractions in their own operations.
As one who grew up in Indian Country, I learned a great lesson
about leadership from Paiute history. Among the Paiute, the Chief
would not eat until all had been fed. As a consequence, starvation
was relatively rare among the Paiutes. This lesson should not be
lost on presidents of Division I institutions. As the individuals who
are ultimately responsible for the institution's operations, including
the athletics department, presidents must be the first to accept re-
sponsibility for the consequences of failing to run their athletics
programs with integrity. If they would accept such responsibility,
perhaps we could worry less about the integrity of big-time intercol-
legiate athletics in the future.
Either the NCAA, through the infractions process, or a Board
of Trustees, through the corrective process at the institutional level,
will one day muster the courage to penalize the most powerful-the
presidents-and hold them personally accountable for institutional
failure to exercise control over their athletics programs. Given the
power of presidents, and the likelihood that they will oppose efforts
to hold them personally accountable, that move will not be an easy
one. The day when a president is held personally accountable,
however, will be an important day in the history of the NCAA, and
will provide a much-needed incentive at the highest institutional
level to ensure that intercollegiate athletics programs are operated
with integrity. It will herald a new era-an era in which the lauda-
ble rise of presidential responsibility in the governance of intercol-
legiate athletics at all levels will be matched by an equally
praiseworthy and much welcome recognition of personal accounta-
bility on the part of presidents at the institutional level.
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